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I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

As the Internet transitions from a new and emerging technology to a mature and
developed medium, its overall effect continues to grow. In a relatively short period of
time, this multimedia form of communication now influences almost all aspects of a
person’s daily life. The Internet has enabled users to reach out to and hear from other
users throughout the world. While it now has the potential for a worldwide impact,
completely unique forms and methods of communication have developed at the same
time. Tools, such as message boards, blogs, and other social networking features, allow
an individual opinion to reach an incredible audience with extreme speed and simplicity.
With these new tools and possibilities have come new questions about their
consequences. Because much of what is written in blogs and on message boards is done
anonymously, internet services and websites have quickly garnered negative and
defamatory postings about individual non-public people. These pieces of information
could easily threaten individuals’ reputations and privacy. In spite of these negative
consequences, Congress chose to further incentivize the development and expansion of
new types of internet services because of tremendous social and economic opportunities.
With the passage of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), interactive
computer service providers were granted immunity from suits over content created by
third-parties posted on their services. 1 However, the CDA also carves out an exception to
this immunity for intellectual property claims. While it is generally clear that intellectual
property includes federal intellectual property laws, such as patents, copyrights, and
trademarks, it is less clear whether state claims, such as right of publicity, are also exempt
from the CDA’s immunity.
Several cases have arisen recently, where an individual has sued a website or
internet service for allowing a third-party to write or publish information that could
damage the individual’s reputation. That individual then sued to hold the internet service
liable. A split is likely developing between circuit courts regarding whether the CDA

*

J.D. Candidate 2011, Northwestern University School of Law. Special thanks to my wife, Becca, for
her incredible help, support, and constant understanding.
1
47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). The statute defines “interactive computer service” as “any information
service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a
computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such
systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.” 42 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).
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covers claims such as right of publicity, or whether it only applies to federal intellectual
property laws. This distinction is likely to become more prominent as more people seek
to hold websites and internet services liable.
This Comment examines the circuit split, how best to resolve it, and the potential
need for Congress to rethink the CDA. Part II looks at the background and development
of the CDA and at the right of publicity. Part III examines the emerging circuit split
between interpreting the CDA to include or exclude the right of publicity and in which
direction the courts should ultimately side based on where the law currently stands. Part
IV addresses the potential effects and outcomes of this split and how Congress may need
to readdress the CDA. Part V concludes that the goals and incentives that Congress
intended to achieve and implement are still necessary, but the statute’s provisions require
further defining.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE RIGHT TO PUBLICITY AND EARLY INTERNET LIABILITY
A. Right of Publicity

¶5

In general, the right of publicity is “the inherent right of every human being to
control the commercial use of his or her identity.” 2 The claim stems from the broader
right to privacy in which a person has a basic right “to be let alone.” 3 On the other hand,
the right of publicity has also been characterized as “an inherent property right of all
individuals,” which is distinct from the right to privacy. 4 Consequently, everyone has a
right of publicity, the commercial value of which each person can control, license, and
market. 5 Regardless of the different bases and developments of the right of publicity, it
has important consequences in modern technological contexts. The right of publicity
varies by state. Different states require different elements, and a number of states do not
recognize the claim at all. 6 In states that do recognize it, a right of publicity would
prevent another party from unauthorized use of someone’s image or likeness. 7
Consequently, the right of publicity may apply in situations where false information is
written about someone on an internet website. In other words, plaintiffs have attempted
to assert this right to protect themselves and to hold another party liable.
B. Liability for Internet Providers/Services

¶6

The potential for, and consequences of, holding internet providers liable for a thirdparty’s use of an individual’s image or likeness was highlighted in 1995 in Stratton

2

J. Thomas McCarthy, Melville B. Nimmer and the Right of Publicity: A Tribute, 34 UCLA L. REV.
1703, 1704 (1987). See also Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2006) (reviewing
how several cases and other sources have defined the right of publicity).
3
Matthew Minora, Comment, Rumor Has It That Non-Celebrity Gossip Web Site Operators Are
Overestimating Their Immunity Under the Communications Decency Act, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 821,
848–49 (2009) (citing Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
195 (1890)).
4
Id. at 851.
5
McCarthy, supra note 2, at 1710–11.
6
Minora, supra note 3, at 853–54.
7
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
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Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co. 8 Prodigy controlled a network of two million
subscribers who could communicate with each other through various electronic bulletin
boards. 9 One of these electronic bulletin boards enabled users to post and discuss
financial and investment information. 10 One particular user made several negative
statements and criminal accusations about Stratton Oakmont. 11 Stratton Oakmont did not
identify the specific user who posted the statements but instead chose to sue Prodigy.
Specifically, Stratton Oakmont claimed that Prodigy should be considered a publisher,
“subject to liability as if [it] had originally published” the defamatory and libelous
statements. 12 In response, Prodigy argued that it is more appropriate to treat the situation
as analogous to a distributor, “such as book stores and libraries [that] may be liable for
defamatory statements of others only if they knew or had reason to know of the
defamatory statement at issue.” 13
Ultimately, the court relied on two issues when determining that Prodigy should be
treated as a publisher. First, “Prodigy held itself out to the public and its members as
controlling the content of its computer bulletin boards.” 14 Second, it utilized a
combination of a software screening program and board leaders to remove certain
content. 15 As a result, Prodigy was found liable for defamatory statements made on its
service.
In other words, Prodigy had placed itself in a position where it could exercise some
degree of editorial control. Specifically, the court explained, “Prodigy has uniquely
arrogated to itself the role of determining what is proper for its members to post and read
on its bulletin boards.” 16 Unlike a bookstore or library, Prodigy chose to implement
certain policies and services to achieve the benefits of control. 17 By doing so, it
transformed itself into a publisher subject to broader liability. 18 However, the court did
note that these issues “may ultimately be preempted by federal law if the
Communications Decency Act of 1995” was passed by Congress. 19
It quickly became clear that the potential for liability could distort incentives and
create severe consequences for a new media company. Prodigy had been found liable, in
part, because it had implemented some degree of control and made some effort to exert
editorial influence. In effect, Prodigy opened itself up to liability, because it attempted to
monitor the content posted on its service. In other words, “an operator . . . which
assumed the responsibility for at least attempting to keep defamatory or offensive
material from being posted on its bulletin boards, was liable as a publisher for defamatory
postings, but an operator . . . which made no such attempt escaped publisher liability.” 20
8
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24,
1995).
9
Id. at *1.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id. at *3.
13
Id.
14
Id. at *4.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id. at *5.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
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This decision could drastically impact new internet services. It seemed likely to
have a direct influence on policy decisions at these new companies. From a government
standpoint, “Congress feared that these sorts of decisions would result in a chilling effect
on Internet speech because the potential to face publisher liability would create a
disincentive for [Internet Service Providers] to function.” 21 As newer technologies
enabled larger numbers of people to create and post content very quickly, companies
could not realistically monitor their services to the degree necessary to protect themselves
from liability. Consequently, Congress became very concerned about restricting
innovation and development.
III. THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT AND EMERGING CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. The Communications Decency Act

Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act in 1996. 22 The statute was
written partially in response to the recent Stratton Oakmont decision. One major goal
was to give greater protections to service providers by ensuring that “[n]o provider or
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider.” 23 Because Stratton
Oakmont exposed the potential for liability, “Congress enacted [the CDA] to remove the
disincentives to self regulation created by the Stratton Oakmont decision.” 24 Overall,
Congress hoped the new legislation would correct the misaligned incentives for an
internet provider attempting to regulate its content. 25
¶12
Furthermore, as the Internet was still in its very early stages, it greatly benefited
from public policy “to promote [its] continued development . . . to preserve the vibrant
and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet . . . to encourage the
development of technologies which maximize user control . . . [and] to remove
disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering
technologies . . . .” 26 Through the statute, Congress hoped to promote the continued
development of the Internet, while acknowledging that it would be impossible for service
providers to review for defamatory information in all of the content within their control.27
Congress desired to achieve these objectives with little government regulation by creating
the correct incentives and removing liability disincentives. By reducing risks and
regulations, Congress made a “policy choice by providing immunity even where the
¶11

upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 61 ALB. L. REV. 147, 158 (1997).
21
Melissa A. Troiano, Comment, The New Journalism? Why Traditional Defamation Laws Should
Apply to Internet Blogs, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1447, 1456 (2006).
22
47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
23
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). “The term ‘interactive computer service’ means any information service,
system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a
computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such
systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).
24
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997). See also Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d
1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing legislative history of § 230); Sheridan, supra note 20, at 161
(discussing conference report of § 230).
25
Troiano, supra note 21, at 1455–56.
26
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)–(5).
27
Troiano, supra note 21, at 1456.
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interactive service provider has an active, even aggressive role in making available
content prepared by others.” 28
¶13
The primary method by which Congress hoped to accomplish these goals was to
provide immunity from liability for internet service providers and users. In Stratton
Oakmont, the court evaluated Prodigy as a re-publisher. In order to protect other service
providers, the CDA specifies that interactive computer service providers will not be
treated as publishers of the content on their services provided by others. 29 Shortly after
the passage of the act, the courts began to interpret and apply this provision. As the court
in Zeran v. America Online, Inc., explained:
By its plain language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action
that would make service providers liable for information originating with a thirdparty user of the service. Specifically, § 230 precludes courts from entertaining
claims that would place a computer service provider in a publisher’s role. Thus,
lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s
traditional editorial function—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw,
postpone or alter content—are barred. 30

Lawsuits aimed at service providers for third-party content created an obvious threat to
free speech, so Congress established broad federal immunity. 31
¶14
Congress did create an important exception to this broad immunity. While service
providers would be protected from most claims, the CDA would not protect them from
intellectual property claims: “[n]othing in [§ 230] shall be construed to limit or expand
any law pertaining to intellectual property.” 32 While this provision is relatively
straightforward, it is not always clear what is considered a “law pertaining to intellectual
property.” 33 There is little doubt that federal IP laws, such as patent, copyright, and
trademark, qualify as pertaining to intellectual property. On the other hand, there are
several other types, mostly state laws, which partially pertain to intellectual property. 34
These areas have caused significant confusion. Plaintiffs hope that the courts will
consider claims like the right of publicity as intellectual property based ones, while the
internet providers argue otherwise.
B. Excluding Right of Publicity from the CDA’s Intellectual Property Exception
¶15

The Ninth Circuit confronted the question of how far the CDA’s immunity extends
in Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc. 35 Plaintiff Christianne Carafano began receiving

28

Robert T. Langdon, Note, The Communications Decency Act § 230: Make Sense? Or Nonsense?—A
Private Person’s Inability to Recover If Defamed in Cyberspace, 73 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 829, 852 (1999).
29
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
30
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
31
Id. at 330–31.
32
47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2).
33
Id.
34
See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1119 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007) (State laws that may be
characterized as intellectual property laws include “trademark, unfair competition, dilution, right of
publicity and trade defamation.”).
35
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003).
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numerous threatening and sexually explicit phone calls, emails, and written letters. 36 She
soon discovered that several days earlier, an unknown person had posted a personal
profile of her on Matchmaker.com, an internet dating service. 37 Although the profile was
not authorized by Carafano and was done without her knowledge, the creator posted
pictures of her and listed several movies and television shows in which she had
previously acted. 38 The profile also displayed her home address, telephone number, and a
fake contact email address. 39 Soon after she began receiving the threatening calls,
Carafano’s representative contacted Matchmaker.com. The company first blocked access
to the profile and later deleted it entirely. 40 Carafano then proceeded to file a complaint
against Matchmaker.com alleging several claims, including misappropriation of the right
of publicity. 41
¶16
After the trial court rejected the claim for misappropriation, Carafano appealed.
The Ninth Circuit addressed “whether [her] claims are barred by 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c)(1) . . . .” 42 The court first determined that Matchmaker.com is closer to an
interactive computer service than an information content provider, because the profile
created by the user does not have any content until that content is provided by the user. 43
In other words, “so long as a third party willingly provides the essential published
content, the interactive service provider receives full immunity regardless of the specific
editing or selection process.” 44
¶17
Furthermore, the court was reluctant to hold the defendant accountable, because
“Congress made a policy choice . . . not to deter harmful online speech through the
separate route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for
other parties’ potentially injurious messages.” 45 By imposing this type of liability, these
new intermediary types of services could easily restrict free speech. Congress was
unwilling to allow this result. Although Carafano argued that Matchmaker.com partially
contributed to the content of the posted information by providing structure, “Matchmaker
still lacks responsibility for the ‘underlying misinformation.’” 46 In Carafano, the Ninth
Circuit relied heavily on policy implications when holding that the CDA’s immunity for
service providers also included protection from misappropriation of the right of publicity
suits. Congress chose to protect free speech. More importantly, it granted websites the
freedom to use third-party provided information to create and develop new services.
Through this decision, the court implicitly signaled that it would not consider
misappropriation of right of publicity as an intellectual property claim, because it would
consequently be excluded from the CDA’s immunity. 47

36

Id. at 1121.
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 1122.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 1124.
44
Id. See also Jurin v. Google, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1122 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
45
Jurin, 695 F. Supp. 2d at 1123 (quoting Zeran v. Am. Online, 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997)).
46
Id. at 1125.
47
See Patricia Sanchez Abril, Repu-taint Sites and the Limits of § 230 Immunity, 12 No. 7 J. INTERNET
L. 3, 5 (2009).
37
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Several years later, the Ninth Circuit more directly addressed how state claims such
as the right of publicity relate to the CDA’s intellectual property provision in Perfect 10,
Inc. v. CCBill LLC. 48 Perfect 10 is a publisher of a magazine and website featuring
models, most of whom have released and assigned their rights of publicity to Perfect 10. 49
Defendants provide services, such as web hosting and data center connections as well as
allowing customers to use credit cards. 50 Perfect 10 alleged various claims against the
defendants, including violation of right of publicity. 51
Unlike the earlier Carafano case, the Ninth Circuit in Perfect 10 directly addressed
the CDA’s intellectual property exception. 52 While courts have interpreted the CDA to
protect internet services from liability for information provided by third-parties, this
immunity is not unlimited. Courts must “construe Section 230(c)(1) in a manner that
would neither ‘limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.’” 53 While the
CDA makes a clear exception, it “does not contain an express definition of ‘intellectual
property,’ and there are many types of claims in both state and federal law which may—
or may not—be characterized as ‘intellectual property’ claims.” 54
If a broad interpretation of intellectual property were adopted that included many of
these claims, the court would be “permitting the reach of any particular state’s definition
of intellectual property to dictate the contours of this federal immunity . . . .” 55 In other
words, a state would have the ability to alter and restrict the congressionally created
immunity merely by creating its own definition of intellectual property. The court held
that this “would be contrary to Congress’s expressed goal of insulating the development
of the Internet from the various state-law regimes.” 56
Because the CDA’s intellectual property exception constrains the general liability
immunity, the broader a court’s interpretation of intellectual property, the narrower the
CDA’s immunity becomes. Therefore, because Congress did not explicitly define
intellectual property but did state an explicit policy of fostering innovation and free
speech, the court construed intellectual property to mean only federal intellectual
property. 57
The Ninth Circuit has chosen to interpret the CDA to not include state intellectual
property claims, including the right of publicity, within the exception to the statute’s
liability protection. In order to resolve the statute’s lack of explicit definition for
intellectual property, the court looked to various policy implications. 58 By granting any
immunity in the first place, “Congress intended to treat the Internet differently from

48

Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1108.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
See also Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2006) (general discussion of right of
publicity and § 230, but unnecessary for district court to address whether the CDA preempts right of
publicity claim).
53
Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(e)(2) (2006)).
54
Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1118.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 1119.
58
Id. at 1118.
49
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traditional forms of communication such as newspapers, radio, and television.” 59 The
court likely wanted to draw a clear line, because “[s]tates have any number of laws that
could be characterized as intellectual property laws: trademark, unfair competition,
dilution, right of publicity and trade defamation . . . .” 60 Despite the significance of such
an interpretation, the Ninth Circuit is unique in how it directly and explicitly analyzed
this provision of the CDA. 61 It still remains to be seen exactly how this will affect
potential plaintiffs within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction.
¶23
By broadening the immunity exception to include a number of claims beyond
federal intellectual property, the court risked eliminating the protections that Congress
intended to provide. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit focused on the policy of fostering free
speech and encouraging innovation in new internet services. 62 This policy requires broad
immunity protection and therefore a narrow intellectual property exception.
C. Including the Right of Publicity in the CDA’s Intellectual Property Exception
¶24

While the Ninth Circuit has interpreted the CDA’s intellectual property exception
to exclude state claims, other courts have proceeded in the opposite direction. The First
Circuit indirectly addressed the issue in Universal Communications Systems, Inc. v.
Lycos, Inc. 63 Defendant Lycos operates various websites related to stock and financial
information. One feature of these websites is message board hosting. Message board
hosting allows users to post and discuss information about publicly traded companies.64
Plaintiff Universal Communications Systems (UCS) alleged that one or more third-party
users posted false and misleading information about UCS’s financial condition and
management. 65 Consequently, the company sued Lycos on various grounds, including a
state claim of dilution of trade name. 66 This charge differs from the misappropriation of
the right of publicity charge in the Ninth Circuit cases. Nonetheless, it is a state claim
arguably pertaining to intellectual property, which was indirectly addressed by the court.
The district court held that § 230 of the CDA extended immunity to Lycos, and it
dismissed the claims. 67
¶25
Ultimately, the court affirmed the dismissal on other grounds, specifically “because
of the serious First Amendment issues that would be raised by allowing UCS’s
claim . . . .” 68 However, the court still stated when first referring to the trademark
dilution claim, that “[c]laims based on intellectual property laws are not subject to
Section 230 immunity.” 69 Because the court directly dismissed the claim on First
Amendment grounds, any discussion of its relation to the CDA’s liability immunity and
59

Minora, supra note 3, at 840.
Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1119 n.5.
61
Dylan M. Spaduzzi, Note, Publicity Enemy Number One: Federal Immunity for a Virtual World, 40
U. MEM. L. REV. 603, 636 (2010).
62
See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997) (“The specter of tort liability in
an area of such prolific speech would have an obvious chilling effect.”).
63
Universal Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007).
64
Id. at 415.
65
Id. at 416.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 417.
68
Id. at 423.
69
Id. at 422–23 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (2006)).
60
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intellectual exception was merely dicta. However, the fact that the CDA’s intellectual
property provision was discussed in the context of a state intellectual property claim
provides precedent for later opinions to cite.
The following year, another case, Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 70 directly
addressed § 230 and state intellectual property claims in its decision. Defendant
Friendfinder operates various electronic groups that allow members to search for and
meet others using personal online advertisements. 71 Specifically, each user creates a
profile that contains personal information that is viewable by other members. 72 In 2005,
an unknown user posting under a screen name created a profile for a female member.73
This profile contained personal information including biographical data, a nude
photograph, and sexual proclivities. 74 For over a year, the plaintiff was unaware of, and
certainly had not authorized, the profile’s existence, although she claimed that it
reasonably identified her. 75
After discovering the profile, the plaintiff contacted Friendfinder and requested that
the profile be removed. 76 The defendant first replaced the profile with a message
indicating its removal, but the profile continued to appear on other similar websites,
search engines, and advertisements. 77 Ultimately, the plaintiff filed suit against the
defendants putting forth several claims, including invasion of privacy. 78
Similar to the analysis in previous cases, the court first noted that CDA provisions
dictate that interactive computer service providers must be treated as publishers.
Consequently, the providers are not liable for state law claims for publishing content
provided by another information content provider. 79 However, the CDA also provides
that it does not expand or limit intellectual property laws. 80 On this basis, the defendants
argued that the CDA bars all of the state law claims. In contrast, the plaintiff argued that
“her claim for invasion of privacy is premised on a ‘law pertaining to intellectual
property’ unaffected by the Act.” 81 The court was directly confronted with the issue of
how to interpret the intellectual property exception to the CDA’s service provider
immunity.
In analyzing the CDA, the Doe court took a more formal approach, focusing on the
plain meaning of the text. The court began with Universal’s dicta implying that § 230
does not protect these types of claims. 82 First, the intellectual property exception is
drafted specifically as any law implying that there is no limit to only federal laws. 83
70

Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.H. 2008).
Id. at 291.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 292.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id. The plaintiff also argued that the message indicating the profile’s removal “was itself false in
communicating that she was a member of the service and that the profile had been hers in the first place.”
Id.
78
Id. at 298.
79
Id. at 293 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), (e)(3) (2006)).
80
Id. at 294 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2)).
81
Id.
82
Id. at 299.
83
Id.
71

305

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

[2010

Second, the court noted that other provisions of the statute specify federal or state laws. 84
In other words, Congress was aware of situations in which provisions could apply to
either state or federal laws. In other provisions, Congress directly specified a level of
government when clearly referring to only state or only federal laws. By not modifying
intellectual property with the word “state” or “federal,” Congress did not intend to limit
the immunity to either level of government. 85
¶30
Moreover, the court dismissed the policy arguments set forth by the Ninth Circuit
in Perfect 10. While allowing service providers to be held liable for state law intellectual
property claims may create “some challenges for service providers like the defendants,
those challenges would appear to be simply a cost of doing business on-line.” 86
Consequently, the court found it an acceptable tradeoff to granting providers complete
immunity. The court ultimately followed the Universal dicta. It focused on the plain
language of the law instead of following the Ninth Circuit’s attention to the policy’s
implications and effects. Both state and federal intellectual property laws were exempt
from the CDA’s § 230 service provider immunity, and the defendant’s motion to dismiss
the right of publicity claim was denied. 87
¶31
While some circuit courts have not definitively ruled on their own interpretations of
§ 230(c)(1) and (e)(2), other district courts have addressed the issue. In Atlantic
Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 88 defendant Project Playlist operates a website
that compiles links to sound recordings on other websites so that users can search for,
listen to, and share songs. 89 The plaintiffs own the copyrights to many of the songs
Project Playlist posted, and they sued on several grounds, including claims for commonlaw copyright infringement and unfair competition. 90 Although copyright is normally a
federal issue, the plaintiffs alleged a state law copyright infringement claim.
Consequently, the court’s analysis is the same as other courts’ analysis of the right of
publicity under the CDA.
¶32
The court first concluded that Project Playlist first fell under the general immunity
of § 230(c)(1). The plaintiffs then argued that § 230(e)(2) applied, and that “the CDA
does not limit any law pertaining to intellectual property, and therefore their state law
claims can proceed.” 91 The court followed a textual analysis of the statute and rejected
the defendant’s motion to dismiss. 92 Similar to the Doe court’s focus on the literal
statutory text, the court held that the inclusion of the word “any” and the lack of the
words “federal” or “state” indicated that the provision includes all types of intellectual
property claims. 93 Furthermore, the court reasoned that any analysis of the CDA’s
history or purpose, such as in the Ninth Circuit’s reading, was inappropriate because the
84
Id. at 299–300. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the
enforcement of . . . any other Federal criminal statute.”); 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (“Nothing in this section
shall be construed to prevent any State from enforcing any State law . . . .”).
85
Doe, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 300.
86
Id. at 302.
87
Id. at 304.
88
Atl. Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
89
Id. at 693–94.
90
Id. at 693, 698.
91
Id. at 702.
92
Id. at 704.
93
Id. at 703–04.
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plain language was clear. 94 While looking to the specific policy goals of the CDA may
lead courts to interpret § 230(e)(2) to exempt only federal intellectual property claims
from the liability immunity, a plain textual analysis leads to the conclusion that all forms
of intellectual property claims are exempt.
D. Reconciling the Circuit Split
¶33

While the courts have reached two competing interpretations of § 230(c)(1) and
(e)(2) of the Communications Decency Act, this split must ultimately be resolved
because of the vastly different outcomes to which each interpretation leads. Based on the
current views of certain state intellectual property claims and on the text of the act, all
forms of intellectual property claims should be exempt from the CDA’s immunity
exception provision.
¶34
One of the first areas in which this issue arose was in the context of a person’s right
of publicity. 95 Because only some consider this a true intellectual property right, a
service provider infringer may not be immune from liability. Although the right of
publicity is not based in federal law and has grown from a variety of rights and areas, 96 it
has “matured into a distinctive legal category occupying an important place in the law of
intellectual property.” 97 Furthermore, the right serves a purpose similar to other types of
intellectual property, such as protecting an intangible quality or idea. 98 The main
difference between federal intellectual property rights (e.g., patents and copyrights) and
state law claims (e.g., right of publicity) is merely how they were developed by Congress
or state legislatures.
¶35
When holding that the CDA only exempts federal intellectual property claims from
its immunity, the Ninth Circuit focused on Congress’s intent to promote the development
of the Internet. 99 However, the fact that Congress intended to remove liability as an
impediment to innovation does not explain how far the immunity exception should be
extended. Although the statute expressly states a goal of promoting Internet growth, it is
clear that Congress did not intend to remove all liability. 100 The exceptions to immunity
were included precisely because Congress did not intend to grant complete and total
protection.
¶36
The Ninth Circuit went directly to what it perceived as the purpose of the CDA to
guide its interpretation. However, it may not even be necessary to look beyond the text
itself, 101 which is the case for this provision of the statute. There are four clarifications in
94

Id. at 704.
See, e.g., Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003); Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill
LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007); Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.H.
2008).
96
See supra Part II.A.
97
McCarthy, supra note 2, at 1712.
98
See Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 1448 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he distinction that
appellants draw between what is protected by the right of publicity and what is protected by other forms of
intellectual property rights, such as copyright, is not sound.”). See also ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc.,
332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003).
99
Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1125 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1) (2006)).
100
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2).
101
See Atl. Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(“Because the plain language of the CDA is clear . . . the Court need not engage in an analysis of the
95

307

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

[2010

the statute regarding how it will affect other laws. Each of these subsections, other than
the intellectual property provision, specifies either state or federal law. 102 Specifically,
there is no effect on any federal criminal law, states are not prevented from enforcing
consistent state law, and the Act does not limit application of any state law similar to the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act. 103 The lack of any state or federal modifier for
the intellectual property exception clearly indicates an intention to not further limit its
exception. In contrast to the three other exceptions, intellectual property must refer to
both state and federal claims. As a result, “a court that interprets § 230(e)(2) to only
apply to federal intellectual property law is improperly adding words to the statute and
disregarding Congress’s obvious intention to remove federal immunity from state and
federal intellectual property law claims.” 104 If Congress had only intended to exclude
federal intellectual property rights, it would have been as explicit as it was elsewhere in
the statute.
¶37
Moreover, this broad interpretation is further emphasized by the fact that the
section applies to “any” intellectual property law. 105 The use of “any” together with the
lack of a “federal” or “state” modifier results in an unambiguous meaning of the statute’s
plain language. Courts should follow the First Circuit’s reading of the CDA and hold that
service providers may be liable for all forms of intellectual property claims.
IV. EFFECTS, OUTCOMES, AND FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
EXCEPTION TO CDA IMMUNITY
¶38

Courts should interpret the Communications Decency Act to exclude both state and
federal intellectual property claims from the service provider immunity. This reading
most accurately follows the current text. However, Congress should reevaluate this
outcome based on the goals of the statute and because of the latest effects. In other
words, the First Circuit’s interpretation may be the most correct, but the Ninth Circuit’s
view may produce a better outcome.
¶39
While § 230(e)(2) is meant to keep the CDA from interfering with existing
intellectual property rights, it has also created a large exception to the law’s goal of
immunizing service providers. This exception may likely overtake the rule as injured
individuals continue to seek compensation for their injuries. Allowing service providers
to continue to be held liable for state law claims such as the right of publicity “is
inconsistent with the values hierarchy established by the [CDA] and with its underlying
policy.” 106 One of the consequences of the Internet’s openness, availability, and ease of
CDA’s legislative history or purpose.”) (citing Lee v. Bankers Trust Co., 166 F.3d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1999)
(holding that plain meaning of a statute controls and legislative history only used if terms are ambiguous)).
102
47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1)–(4).
103
Id.
104
Spaduzzi, supra note 61, at 640.
105
Atl. Recording, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 704 (citing ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 543 F.3d 59, 69 (2d Cir. 2008)
(holding “any” should be given “expansive application where the surrounding statutory language and other
relevant legislative context support it”)).
106
Rachel A. Purcell, Note, Is That Really Me?: Social Networking and the Right of Publicity, 12 VAND.
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 611, 634 (2010). Furthermore, federal intellectual property rights are much more in
need of protection because they directly lead to the creation of new ideas. “While traditional intellectual
property rights foster and reward innovation and invention, nothing need be created to take advantage of
the inherent right of publicity.” Id. at 634.
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use is that many more people can be potential victims of defamation and suffer harm to
their reputations. 107 In other words, “technology makes us all public figures in a way that
had never been anticipated by . . . the CDA.” 108 Because anyone can be a victim, it is
inevitable that many more people will look for a defendant to hold accountable.
Although the CDA attempts to immunize service providers for liability from most
of these injuries, the exceptions provide an opportunity for people to exploit. An injured
person may try to evade the CDA immunity and seek out new ways to hold internet
service providers accountable. 109 When plaintiffs are unable to hold service providers
liable for defamatory content under normal theories of liability, they have “argu[ed] some
novel theories of liability.” 110 If all forms of intellectual property claims continue to be
exempted, plaintiffs will continue to exploit this exception, eliminating much of the
immunity that the CDA was meant to provide. Based on Congress’s original goal of
fostering innovation, it is unlikely that Congress meant to broaden the intellectual
property exception to such an extent.
Furthermore, Congress should reevaluate the CDA to revisit some of its original
goals now that it has had several years to observe the effects. One of the defined goals of
the CDA was to encourage self-regulation. 111 Because of the clear line the CDA draws
between liability for service providers and content providers, services are incentivized to
remain inactive. Specifically, “[s]o long as the ISPs remain passive interactive computer
services and do not cross the elusive line into ‘information content providers,’ the safe
harbor applies, and they are immune.” 112 This incentive has only increased as the amount
of third-party information provided increases, and services find it harder to effectively
monitor.
In addition, a significant amount of time has passed since the CDA was adopted,
and “the Internet is no longer a burgeoning medium that needs special protections in
order to grow.” 113 Consequently, defamation laws as they relate to the Internet may need
to adapt as well. What Congress needs and wants to encourage may change over time.
Such a broad, but relatively undefined immunity is not necessary, nor is it appropriate at
this time. 114 Revisiting the CDA will allow Congress to evaluate and adjust its original
goals. It will be able to better focus liability immunity on the parties for which it was
intended.
Redefining the intellectual property exception to service provider immunity so it
does not include state claims is also necessary because of the lack of uniformity among
state intellectual property rights. While federal intellectual property laws are well
defined, “[s]tates have any number of laws that could be characterized as intellectual
107

Abril, supra note 47, at 6.
Id.
109
See Bradley C. Nahrstadt & Jeremy T. Burton, Must You Watch What You Say? Application of CDA
to Publications on the Internet, 12 No. 9 J. INTERNET L. 1, 21–22 (2009).
110
Id. at 17. See also Laurin H. Mills & Leslie Paul Machado, ISP Immunity Provision is Broadly
Interpreted but One Exception Exists When a Violation of Trademark Law is Alleged, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 15,
2002, at 6 (Protecting ISPs from most tort claims but not trademark claims is “certain to inspire some
strained trademark claims as creative plaintiffs’ attorneys attempt to circumvent the § 230 immunities in
search of deep pockets.”).
111
47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b) (2006).
112
Abril, supra note 47, at 4.
113
Troiano, supra note 21, at 1467–68.
114
See id. at 1470–71. See also Abril, supra note 47, at 5.
108
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property laws: trademark, unfair competition, dilution, right of publicity and trade
defamation . . . .” 115 If all possible state intellectual property claims are included in the
CDA’s immunity exception, service providers must be aware of all the widely varied
laws. 116 This unfortunately adds a greater burden to service providers as they struggle to
comply with differing state laws. 117
¶44
In order to effectively and efficiently encourage innovation, as Congress originally
intended, there must be a clear boundary demarking the claims for which an internet
service provider is immune or liable. 118 This lack of a clear definition is further
complicated by the fact that information on the Internet is visible in multiple states and
jurisdictions. 119 Consequently, any single state’s definition of an intellectual property
claim directly defines a service provider’s immunity. 120 The likely result in this situation
is that the lowest applicable state law standard becomes the bar that a website or service
provider must meet. 121 In other words, the issues caused by the lack of uniformity among
different state intellectual property laws further highlight why Congress should specify
the exact extent of the § 230(e)(2) exception.
¶45
Finally, the overall policy of the Communications Decency Act and § 230 point in
favor of only federal intellectual property claims being excluded from the service
provider immunity. Although the Internet has grown from an emerging medium to a
mature and established platform, Congress’s original First Amendment concerns are still
applicable. When first considering the CDA, Congress felt that the Internet had great
potential for making information available to citizens and for providing necessary
Furthermore, it
“political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services.” 122
“recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of speech in the new and
burgeoning Internet medium.” 123 The service provider liability immunity attempts to
eliminate what could otherwise be a chilling effect on free speech. 124 However, these
concerns still exist. If the new and innovative services that exist today are partially a
result of the freedom from fear of liability for service providers, further innovation will
slow when the immunity is removed. Immunity is just as important today as when the
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Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1119 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007). The court further
explained, “[S]tate laws protecting ‘intellectual property,’ however defined, are by no means uniform.
Such laws may bear various names, provide for varying causes of action and remedies, and have varying
purposes and policy goals.” Id. at 1118. See also Minora, supra note 3, at 852 (“The right of publicity is a
state law doctrine; therefore, its acceptance and application vary among the twenty-four jurisdictions that
recognize it.”).
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See Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1118.
117
Purcell, supra note 106, at 626.
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See Atl. Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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Purcell, supra note 106, at 626–27.
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See Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1119.
121
The Doe court states that the Ninth Circuit in Perfect 10 and the defendants in its own case argued
but could not state an example of state law’s definition of intellectual property that differs from the federal
law. Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 301 (D.N.H. 2008). However, even the
possibility of a difference injects uncertainty into the CDA’s coverage which restricts the statute from
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Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
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Id. at 331.
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Internet was first being developed, because new technologies and applications still
continue to be created and evolve. 125
¶46
Practicality concerns also play an important role. As new services continue to
evolve, service providers desire a degree of predictability. Certainty allows a provider to
know when it can freely innovate and when it can only do so while risking a lawsuit.
Interpreting § 230(e)(2) to include all types of intellectual property claims forces service
providers to be even more diligent in monitoring the information on their services. While
this is an admirable goal, it is likely an impossible task considering the growth of the
amount of information content being produced and provided on the Internet. Overall, a
narrow intellectual property exception to the CDA is necessary to continue to foster
growth and provide incentives to innovate. Innovation on the Internet has not slowed
from its incredible beginning as services continue to evolve and new applications
develop. The open nature, minimal regulation, and protection from harmful liability are
still necessary components to that rapid growth and evolution. Because the current text
of the CDA exempts state law claims that pertain to intellectual property from service
provider immunity, Congress should reevaluate the statute. It should clarify and
specifically define the boundaries of the intellectual property exception in a narrow
manner.
V. CONCLUSION
¶47

The passage of the Communications Decency Act has removed much of the
potential liability for internet services providing third-party content. This immunity has
coincided with extensive growth and innovation of new internet services. There does
remain an important exception for laws pertaining to intellectual property rights.
Because it is unclear whether service providers are immune from state intellectual
property laws, a split in interpretation has developed among several circuit courts of
appeals.
¶48
By analyzing the plain language of the statute’s text and not focusing on uncertain
policy implications, courts should hold that state intellectual property claims, such as the
right of publicity, are exempt from the CDA’s grant of immunity. However, because this
interpretation will likely have important policy implications, Congress should reevaluate
the CDA and its intellectual property exception. The exception may eventually overtake
the general rule of liability immunity. This will cause needless uncertainty because of the
differences and lack of uniformity among various state interpretations of state intellectual
property rights. Finally, Congress should further define the intellectual property
exception, because its original policy goals of maintaining free speech and fostering
growth and innovation are still applicable and necessary today.
¶49
Congress chose to allow some potential harm to individuals in favor of not stifling
growth of the newly created Internet. Even in its developed form, the Internet continues
to experience growth and innovation, while becoming even more a part of people’s lives.
These issues are unlikely to disappear, so it is necessary to continue to evaluate the
purposes and effects of legislation like the Communications Decency Act. Although it is
far more developed since its beginning, the Internet is still a relatively new medium, and

125

See Abril, supra note 47, at 4; Purcell, supra note 106, at 632.
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favorable policies are necessary to maintain its growth. By granting immunity to service
providers, individuals harmed by third-party content do lose a potential party to hold
liable, but there always remains the possibility of holding the content provider
responsible.
¶50
In addition, the service providers themselves always have an incentive to protect
their users as they are forced to compete for business with other service providers. With
clear and well-defined boundaries for service provider liability, both the service provider
and the individual user can adjust behavior and operate based on known risks.
Furthermore, because the pace of change and development for internet services is so
quick, legislation and policies, even if only a few years old, may no longer be achieving
the goals for which they were originally written. Congress must continually evaluate and
adjust the incentives and protections, because, with these goals in mind, it is possible to
maintain the growth and online innovation all parties desire.
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